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COMMENT
In Re Longstaff- Lesbian and Gay Aliens
Denied Naturalization
I.

INTRODUCTION

In In re Longstaff, the Fifth Circuit held that a resident alien
may be denied naturalization if he or she was homosexual when admitted to the United States. The court based its holding on the assumption that an alien who was homosexual at the time of entry was
admitted unlawfully.I The holding allows the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to deny lesbian and gay aliens naturalization
and admittance. 2 The court's decision follows a 1979 policy change
by the Surgeon General, who had issued a memorandum advising the
INS officers to stop referring aliens to the Public Health Service
(PHS) 3 for mental examinations solely to determine whether they
were homosexuals. 4 Prior to the Surgeon General's policy change,
1. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2668 (1984).
The court based its holding on its construction of the Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act of 1952 and its amendments. The court found that Congress' clear intent was
to exclude homosexuals.
2. The INS was the first of three agencies to administer the U.S. immigration laws. The
service was created by the Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084. The INS operates as a
branch of the Justice Department, under the Attorney General. The General Counsel of the

INS is responsible for the legal advisory, legislative, litigation and trial attorney activities. The
special inquiry officers of the INS conduct exclusion and deportation hearings. Immigration
officers of the INS are responsible for the first line enforcement of the law. See E. HARPER,
IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, 60-63 (3d ed. 1975).
3. Physicians of the agency that later became the PHS have been medical advisors for
the immigration agencies since 1891. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084. The PHS
is now part of the Department of Health and Human Services. The responsibility of the PHS
for the physical and mental examinations of aliens is defined in Section 325 of the Public
Health Service Act of July 1, 1944, ch. 373, 58 Stat. 697, which provides that "[t]he Surgeon
General shall provide for making, at places within the United States or in other countries, such
physical and mental examinations of aliens as are required by the immigration laws, subject to
administrative regulations prescribed by the Attorney General and medical regulations prescribed by the Surgeon General with the approval of the Administrator." See E. HARPER,
supra note 2, at 69-70.
4. Memorandum from Julius Richmond, Assistant Secretary for Health, United States
Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, and Surgeon General, to William Foege and George
Lythott (Aug. 2, 1979) quoted in Memorandum Opinion for the Acting Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, No. 79-85, 3 Op. Office of Legal Counsel 457, 458 (1979).
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the PHS had routinely certified aliens as homosexual.5 These aliens
were then excluded from admittance to the United States based on
section 212(a)(4) of the Immigration Act, which "exclude[s] from admission into the United States. . .[a]liens afflicted with psychopathic
personality, or sexual deviation, or a mental defect."' 6 In response to
the Surgeon General's policy change, the INS unilaterally developed a
policy of excluding these aliens based solely on their admission of
7
homosexuality.
The Fifth Circuit used In re Longstaff to discuss the legality of
the INS policy of denying entry to lesbian and gay aliens without PHS
certification. In construing the Immigration and Nationality (McCarren-Walter) Act of 19528 [the Immigration Act] to allow the INS to
continue its new policy, In re Longstaff directly conflicts with the
Ninth Circuit case, Hill v. INS. 9 The Supreme Court recently denied
certiorari to Longstaff, leaving the future of immigration for lesbian
and gay aliens uncertain. 10
This note analyzes the court's decision in light of the statute's
history, the statute's language and structure, prior judicial decisions,
and past INS practice. The note further analyzes the methods the
court applies in finding that Congress intended to exclude lesbian and
gay aliens without a PHS certificate. Specifically, this note examines
the court's method of reasoning and its application of statutory construction rules. The note concludes that the Fifth Circuit's decision
was unwarranted.
5. See, e.g., In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1446 & n. 43. "mT1he administrative practice
has been to exclude for homosexuality only those persons for whom a [PHS] certificate was
issued."
6. Immigration and Nationality (McCarren-Walter) Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)
(1976) (The fint "or" does not appear in the codification of the Act.) [hereinafter cited as

Immigration Act].
7. See Memorandum from John Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, to David Crossland, Acting Commissioner, INS (Dec. 10, 1979); Department of Justice Press Release (Sept.
9, 1980). For an in-depth treatment of this history, see also Bogatin, The Immigration and
NationalityAct and the Exclusion of Homosexual& Boutilier v. INS Revisited, 2 CARDOZO L.
REv. 359, 369-72 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Boutilier Revisited] (The note examines the Immigration Act and its predecessor and determines that the Surgeon General has the authority
to define the Immigration Act's medical terms).

8. Immigration Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 eL seq. (1976).
9. Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that Congress intended to require
the INS to obtain a PHS medical certificate before excluding homosexuals from the United

States under the psychopathic personality provision of the Immigration Act).
10.

Longstaff v. INS, 104 S. Ct. 2668 (1984).

In Re Longstaff

1985]
II.

THE FACTS OF IN RE LONGSTAFF

Richard John Longstaff, a native of the United Kingdom, was
admitted to the United States as a permanent resident on November
14, 1965. In his "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration," he answered "no" to the question, "Are you now or have you
ever been afflicted with psychopathic personality, epilepsy, mental defect, fits, fainting spells, convulsions or a nervous breakdown?"II The
INS application based the question on Section 212(a)(4) of the Immigration Act. 12

Longstaff eventually settled in Texas, established a business, and
sought naturalization after fifteen years in this country. Ignoring the
naturalization examiner's recommendation, the district court denied
Longstaff's application for naturalization. It found that Longstaff had
violated the Texas Penal Code by engaging in homosexual activity,
had exhibited a lack of candor in answering questions about his activities, and had failed to carry his burden of establishing good moral
character as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3) (1976).13 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed on the ground that Longstaff had failed to carry his
burden of proof on the issue of good moral character. 14 The court
remanded, however, to allow Longstaff to present additional evidence
on this point. 15 On remand, an INS examiner interrogated Longstaff
and concluded that he had met his burden of proving good moral
character but that he should nevertheless be denied naturalization because he had engaged in homosexual activity before he entered the
United States. The court concluded that because of Longstaff's homosexual activities, he had not been lawfully admitted. 16 On this basis the trial court again denied Longstaff's petition for
11. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1440.
12. The section "exclude[s] from admission into the United States... [aliens] afflicted
with psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or a mental defect." In 1965, Congress amended this
section to provide that aliens afflicted with "sexual deviation" were to be forbidden entry into
the United States. Immigration Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1976). Congress took this action in
response to the 1962 Ninth Circuit holding in Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652 (1962), that
"psychopathic personality" was unconstitutionally vague as applied to a particular homosexual alien. For an analysis of this change, see Boutilier Revisited, supra note 7, at 366.
13. For an analysis of the "good moral character" requirement vis-a-vis homosexual
aliens, see Hexter, "Good Moral Character"Requirement isa Question of FederalLaw, Nemetz v. INS, 6 SUFFOLK TRANS. L.J. 383 (1982).
14. In re Longstaff, 631 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1980).
15. In re Longstaff, 634 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1980) (on rehearing).
16. In re Longstaff, 538 F. Supp. 589 (N.D. Texas 1982). "Petitioner has not met his
burden of proof that he has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence." Id at 591.
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naturalization.1 7 On appeal the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower
court."
III.

THE REASONING OF THE COURT

The court first stated that no person may be naturalized unless
lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence according to all provisions of the Immigration Act. 19 The court found
that "lawfully admitted" denotes compliance with the substantive requirements of the Immigration Act, not mere procedural regularity.
The court used the deportation provisions of the Act, which provide
for deportation of any alien excludable by any law existing at the time
of entry, to buttress this argument. 20 It also pointed out that the Immigration Act lists thirty-three classes of aliens excludable from the
United States. 21 The court felt that it would be paradoxical if a person ineligible to receive a visa should become lawfully admitted simply because an error allowed him to enter.22 It noted that the
Immigration Act enumerates aliens afflicted with "psychopathic personality" within its list of excluded aliens23 and that in Boutilier v.
INS the Supreme Court held that the Act's legislative history shows a
congressional intent to include homosexuals under the term "psychopathic personality." 24 The court also noted that Congress has unbounded power to exclude aliens from admission to the United States
and that it may therefore exclude aliens for arbitrary and discriminatory reasons without violating the Constitution.25

The court next addressed Longstaff's argument that the Act only
17. d at 593.
18. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1440. "[B]eing excludable on the ground of his homosexuality when he arrived here, he was not lawfully admitted to the United States."
19. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1441 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (1976)).
20. Id. at 1441-42 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(2) (1976)).
21. Id. at 1442 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
22. Id.
23. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1976)).
24. Id. at 1442 (construing Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 120. "The legislative history of the Act
indicates beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Congress intended the phrase 'psychopathic
personality' to include homosexuals. .. ").
25. Id. "Congress can bar aliens from entering the United States for discriminatory and
arbitrary reasons, even those that might be condemned as a denial of equal protection or due
process if used for purposes other than immigration policy. ... " U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8,cl. 3
gives Congress authority to formulate U.S. policy regarding immigration and naturalization.
The clause provides that Congress shall have the power "to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." See Immigration Laws,
supra note 2, at 4.
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excludes those homosexuals whom a PHS medical officer determines
to be afflicted with "psychopathic personality" or "sexual deviation."
The court stated that Longstaff premised his argument on the Act's
separation of medical reasons from other reasons for exclusion. 26 The
court further explained the history of the medical exclusions and
pointed out that a 1952 PHS report suggested that medical exclusions
be grouped separately. The report proposed grouping together excludable "conditions related to the field of mental disorders and subject to medical determination.1 27 "Psychopathic personality" and
"sexual deviation" fall under the medical reasons for exclusion. 28 The
court nevertheless refused to find that a PHS determination was a
prerequisite for all exclusions based on medical reasons as defined by
the Immigration Act.
The court then scrutinized the Immigration Act itself, noting
that it provides for detaining aliens at the border while "immigration
and medical officers examine them for 'physical and mental defects
and disabilities' that warrant exclusion," ' 29 and that it further specifies
that PHS doctors "shall conduct all medical examinations and shall
certify . . . any physical and mental defect or disease observed by
such medical officers in any such alien." 30 The court evaluated Longstaff's argument, which construed "shall" to mean "must be," in light
of the history and structure of the Immigration Act.3 ' The court recognized that the Act provides that a medical officer's certification of
"any mental disease, defect, or disability" of an enumerated class is
26. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1443. "Longstaff argues [that] [b]ecause these conditions
are 'subject to medical determination'.
only a medical officer has the power to determine
whether any of them exists." Id.
27. Id. (citing REPORT OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ON THE MEDICAL ASPECTS
OF H.R. 2379, A BILL TO REVISE THE LAWS RELATING TO IMMIGRATION,

NATURALIZA-

TION, AND NATIONALITY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, reprintedin 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. &

AD. NEWS 1653, 1700).

28. Immigration Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1976).
29. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1444 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1222 (1976)).
30. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1224 (Supp. V 1981)).
31. Id. at 1445. The court found that homosexuals were first denied admission in 1917.
Act of Feb. 5, 1917, Ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874 (1917) (repealed 1952). The Act prohibited the
admission of "persons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority" certified by a physician to be
"mentally ...
defective." The court further found that Congress renewed the ban in 1952.
Immigration and Nationality Act, § 212(a)(4), 66 Stat. 163 (1952). This Act excluded homosexuals from U.S. entry as persons with "psychopathic personality." Finally, the court noted
that in 1965 Congress added "sexual deviation" to the enumerated list. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)
(1976).

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J.

[Vol. 8:161

conclusive evidence of excludability.3 2 It held that this does not necessarily mean that the absence of a certificate is conclusive evidence of
33
admissibility.
The court then took notice that the administrative practice had
been to exclude only those aliens found to be homosexual through a
PHS certificate. It nevertheless found that a medical certificate was
not indispensable to bar a professed homosexual from entering the
United States because Boutilier inferred from the statute a clear congressional intent to exclude homosexuals, and because Congress declared its intention by amending the Immigration Act in 1965 to bar
"sexual deviates." To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would be to
allow the Surgeon General to "effectively checkmate Congressional
Policy."' 34 It found that in the instant case, Longstaff was admittedly
homosexual and understood the meaning of the word.
The court concluded that the procedural systems built into the
exclusion process merely demonstrate that Congress intended that
only competent evidence of medical excludability be adduced in exclusion proceedings. 35 It further concluded that there was no reason
why an informed applicant's confession that he fell within an excludable class was not competent evidence. 36 The court relied on section
1226(d) of the Immigration Act, which does not expressly forbid an
immigration judge to exclude an alien based on evidence other than
medical certification, 37 and that Boutilier does not indicate that the
INS would have been required to ignore an admission of homosexuality. 38 The court also found that administrative practice and judicial
precedent both disclose the error of Longstaff's argument that his admission into the United States eighteen years ago bars inquiry into his
32.

In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1446 (citing United States ex reL. Shaughnessy, 336 U.S.

806, 809 (1949)).
33. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d) (1976)).
34. Id. at 1447. The court is commenting on the 1979 PHS policy to not medically certify
aliens as homosexual.
35. Id. at 1448.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. "[Section 1226(d)] specifies that, if an immigration judge in an exclusion hearing

is presented with a medical certificate 'that an alien is afflicted... with any mental disease,
defect, or disability,' his decision 'shall be based solely on such certification.' It merely makes
clear that the petitioner has no right to introduce evidence rebutting the certificate. It does not
expressly forbid an immigration judge to find an applicant excludable on the basis of evidence
other than a medical certificate." Id.
38. Id. "Although in Boutilfier, the Public Health Service had issued a class A medical
certificate. . . at the time of his admission, there is no indication in the opinion that the INS

would have been required to ignore an admission by Boutilier that he was a homosexual." Id.

In Re Longstaff
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excludability. 39
The court took notice of the fact that the INS now excludes for
homosexuality if the alien admits to it. 40 It thus reasoned that the
administrative agency had interpreted the Immigration Act so as not
to require a PHS certificate, and stated that the INS interpretation
was entitled to deference.
The court concluded that, although the Surgeon General no
longer considers homosexuality a psychopathic condition, it was
bound by Boutilier's ruling that "psychopathic personality" is a term
of art, and by Congress' intent to bar persons "afflicted with. . . sexual deviation."'41 The court considered itself bound
to uphold homo42
sexual exclusion until Congress changes the law.
IV.

DISSENT'S REASONING

The dissent concluded that, for the reasons extensively detailed
in Hill v. INS, the INS may not lawfully deny a homosexual admission to the United States unless it first obtains a PHS medical certificate. 43 The dissent based its conclusion on the statutory framework of
the Immigration Act. It found that the statute contemplates a medical-personnel diagnosis and certification of any medical cause as a
prerequisite to alien deportation or exclusion. 44 The dissent argued
that by making medical certification the sole evidence for these exclusions, Congress intended to avoid allowing the INS to exclude aliens
from admission at the initial interview. More importantly, the dissent
found that Congress intended to protect aliens from later being
39. Id. at 1448-49. "In numerous... cases, aliens have been deported on the basis of
post-admission determinations that they should have been excluded because of physical or
mental problems." Id.
40. Id. at 1449-50 (citing Press Release of the Department of Justice (Sept. 9, 1980)).
"[The new INS] statement provides that an arriving alien will not be asked any questions
regarding his sexual preference. If an alien 'makes an unambiguous oral or written admission
of homosexuality'. . . or if a third person who is also presenting himself for inspection 'voluntarily states, without prompting or prior questioning, that an alien who arrived in the United
States at the same time . . .is a homosexual,' the alien may be examined privately by an
immigration officer and asked to sign a statement that he is homosexual. That statement forms
the evidentiary basis for exclusion." Id.
41. Id. at 1450-51.
42. Id. at 1451. "We are. . . bound to decide according to a law made in the exercise of
a power that is plenary." See supra note 25.
43. For a discussion of the Hill case, see infra accompanying text at note 65 et seq.
44. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1452 (dissent) (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1224, which provides that the PHS or civil surgeons shall conduct the physical and mental examinations of
aliens excludable under Section 1182(a)(1)-(5), which includes "sexual deviation" and "psychopathic personality").
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brought to trial for deportation on a charge that the alien had a "medical" basis for exclusion at the time of his admission to the United
States. 45 The dissent stressed that it did not base its conclusion on an
interpretation of current medical opinion, but noted adherence to
Boutilier's holding that homosexuality is a term of art included in the
phrase "psychopathic personality." 46 The majority and dissent differed not on whether Congress intended to exclude homosexuals, but
on the proper procedure by which that exclusion may take place. The
dissent argued that Congress must alter the Immigration Act's statutory scheme if it wishes to continue to exclude homosexuals in light of
the Surgeon General's ban on PHS certification for homosexuality. 47
V.

HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
4

A. History of the Statute 8
The Immigration Act of 1917, the predecessor of current immigration law, denied entry to "persons of constitutional psychopathic
inferiority" and to persons49certified by an examining physician to be
"mentally. . . defective." The PHS and INS classified homosexuals as constitutional psychopathic inferiors and/or mental defectives,
45. Id. "[Mledical conditions that allegedly existed at the time of presumably lawful
admission could later be administratively misused to deport persons unpopular in actuality for
non-medical reasons. Thus I believe that Congress intended the medical certification procedure to be interposed as an important safeguard against abusive 'medical' exclusions of deportations by introducing the independent factor of a professional medical examination into this
aspect of the exclusion and deportation process." Id.
46. Id. at 1452 (dissent) (citing Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 124).
47. Id. at 1453. "The importance of adhering to the congressional intent that only professional medical determinations be made, so as to avoid the improper non-medical administrative classification of a person as 'medically' excludable or deportable, requires that the
courts respect these stringent statutory standards by not creating procedural exceptions only
for certain 'medical' conditions." Id.
48. The first federal legislation regulating immigration was the Alien Enemies Act of
June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570. The measure authorized the President to deport any alien
that he deemed dangerous to the U.S. The law expired two years after its enactment.
Congress enacted no new immigration statutes until the Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat.
477. The Act was the first of many to list excludable aliens. It excluded criminals and
prostitutes and entrusted administration to the collectors of the ports. In 1917, Congress
codified all previously enacted exclusion provisions and added to the inadmissable classes. Act
of February 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874. The First Quota Law of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat.
5, was passed, limiting the number of total aliens allowed to enter. On May 26, 1924, a
Permanent Immigration Quota Act, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153, was passed, which, in conjunction
with the Act of 1917, governed U.S. immigration policy until the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952. See Immigration Laws, supra note 2, at 4-13.
49. Ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (1917) (repealed 1952).
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making them ineligible for admission.50 When Congress instituted a
comprehensive revision of immigration laws in 1947, it sought advice
from the PHS with the intent of modernizing the medical portions of
the law concerning medical exclusions." In response, the PHS provided the drafters with definitions of clinical terms such as "psychopathic personality" and "mental defect."' 52 These terms became the
language of the Immigration Act.5 3 Shortly before passage of the Act,
homosexuality was classified by PHS physicians as a "psychopathic
personality" and by' the American Psychiatric Association (APA) as a
"mental disorder." 54

In 1965, Congress amended the Act to include "sexual deviation" as another basis for excluding aliens.5 5 Significantly, at that time
the medical profession no longer considered6 homosexuality a psycho5
pathic personality but a sexual deviation.
B. Boutilier v. INS
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided Boutilier v. INS 57 and held
that the INS could deport an alien for homosexuality under the "psychopathic personality" section of the Immigration Act. Boutilier was
50. "Constitutional psychopathic inferior" was a contemporary medical classification for
individuals "who show a lifelong and constitutional tendency not to conform to the customs of
the group." They were people who "habitually misbehave,. . . have no sense of responsibility

to their fellow men or to society as a whole. . . succumb readily to the temptation of getting
easy money through a life of crime. . .[and] fail to learn by experience." State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 205 Minn. 545, 549, 287 N.W. 297, 300 (1939), affid sub nom. Minn. ex
rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940) (quoting Draper, Mental Abnormality in
Relation to Crime, 2 AM. J. MED. JURIS. 161, 163 (1939)).
51. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d.Cong., 2d Sess. 45-46 (1952), reprintedin 1952 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1699.
52. Id. at 46-48, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1699-1702. An indi-

vidual with psychopathic personality was defined as "a person whose behavior is predominantly amoral or antisocial and characterized by impulsive, irresponsible actions satisfying
only immediate and narcissistic interests without concern for obvious and implicit social consequences accompanied by minimal outward evidence of anxiety or guilt." COMMITTEE ON
PUBLIC INFORMATION, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, A PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY

55 (1st ed. 1957).
53. Immigration Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1976).
54. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968), reprinted in READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIA-

TRY 54 (R. Allen, E. Ferster & J.Rubin eds. 1968) (hereinafter cited as DSM II).
55. Congress acted in response to Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962),
which found the term "psychopathic personality" to be unconstitutionally vague as applied to
a particular homosexual alien.
56. See DSM II, supra note 54; Friedman, Sexual Deviations, 1 AMERICAN HANDBOOK
OF PSYCHIATRY 589-96 (S.Arieti ed. 1959).

57. Boutilier, 387 U.S. 118.
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deported following an INS order which was based on a PHS medical
certificate stating that Boutilier was a "psychopathic personality, sexual deviate" at the time of his entry.5 8 The certificate was issued in
response to an affidavit in which Boutilier described his history of homosexuality. Boutilier brought his own private physicians to challenge the diagnosis. 59
The Supreme Court held that the legislative history of the Act
indicated "beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Congress intended
the phrase 'psychopathic personality' to include homosexuals such as
petitioner." 6 The court discussed H.R. Rep. No. 1365: "It quoted at
length, and specifically adopted, the Public Health Service report
which recommended that the term 'psychopathic personality' be used
to 'specify such types of pathologic behavior as homosexuality or sexual perversion.' ",61 The court found that the testimony of Boutilier's
doctors was irrevelant because the PHS doctors found him to be affficted with psychopathic personality. 62
The Boutilier case is significant to Longstaff because the Longstaff majority ruled to exclude homosexual aliens regardless of any
change in the medical definition of homosexuality based on Boutilier's
ruling that "Congress used the phrase 'psychopathic personality' not
in the clinical sense, but to effectuate its purpose to exclude from entry all homosexuals and other sex perverts. '63 The majority construed Boutilier to hold that the term "psychopathic personality" is
"a term of art, not dependent on medical definition."'
C. Hill v. INS
In 1983, the Ninth Circuit held that the INS abused its discretion
by excluding Hill on the grounds of sexual deviation without first obtaining a medical certificate. 65 The court found that, although the
Act does not specifically call for a PHS certificate, the language and
structure of the Act make it clear that Congress intended to require
medical certification as a prerequisite to alien exclusion under section
58. Id. at 120.
59. Id.
60. Id. It is significant in this context that Boutilier had been PHS certified.
61. Id. at 122. The Court's analysis of the Immigration Act's legislative history makes
clear that Congress' intent was attributed to PHS recommendations. Id. at 121-23.
62. Id. In effect, then, the Supreme Court deferred interpretation of section 212(aX4) of
the Immigration Act to the PHS.
63. Id.
64. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1450.
65. Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983).
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1182(a)(4). The court first looked at 8 U.S.C. § 1222, which provides
that aliens suspected of having a mental disability "shall be detained"
before entry to allow for observation and examination. It found this
section to be "convincing evidence that Congress intended that such
examinations take place and be a prerequisite to exclusion on such
grounds. ' 66 The court next examined 8 U.S.C. § 1224, which provides that "physical and mental examination of arriving aliens . . .
shall be made by medical officers of the United States Public Health
Service, who shall conduct all medical examinations and shall certify
. . . any physical and mental defect. . . ." The court pointed out
that "shall" is generally construed to denote a mandatory requirement. 67 It further found that it would violate congressional intent to
allow INS officers, not medically trained, to determine psychopathic
personality, sexual deviation or mental defect by interrogating aliens.
The court next construed 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d) to show that the
language and structure of the Act evidence a medical certificate requirement. 68 This section specifies that if an alien afflicted with one of
the diseases enumerated in section 11 82(a)(6) is certified by a medical
officer, then the decision to exclude the alien "shall be based solely
upon such certification." 69 Finally, the court looked at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(a), which provides that "the inspection, other than the physical and mental examination. . . shall be conducted by immigration
officers."' 70 It interpreted this section to mean that immigration officers are not to perform physical and mental examinations by obtaining admissions. These examinations must be performed by
doctors. The court found that, although any of these sections standing alone leaves some ambiguity, viewed as a whole they show a clear
Congressional intent to establish a procedure for medical examinations and certification as a prerequisite to excluding aliens under the
71
medical exclusions.
The court then turned to the legislative history to corroborate its
reading of the statute. It found that Congress organized section 1182
into two categories, medically determined and nonmedically determined exclusions. It further found that the PHS report adopted into
66. Id. at 1474.
67. Id. at 1475 (citing United States v. Machado, 306 F. Supp. 995, 997 (N.D. Cal.

1969)).
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d)).
Id.
Id.
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the Act referred to homosexuality as medically determined. 72 The report referred to "the diagnosis of homosexuality" and to the utility of
"psychological tests [which] may be helpful in uncovering homosexuality of which the individual, himself, may be unaware.

' 73

The court

reasoned that the report showed Congress and the PHS thought homosexuality was diagnosable, and that the PHS would make any medical determinations. The court turned to the House Report's
procedures for exclusion, and found that the procedure explicitly required at least one qualified medical officer to make medical
74
examinations.
The court then focused on the INS interpretation of the statute.
It cited the proposition that courts show great respect for a statute's
construction given by the agents of the administrative agency charged
with its administration. 75 The court took notice of the fact that prior
to the change in the PHS policy regarding homosexual certification,
the INS had consistently required a medical examination and certificate for alien exclusion on medical grounds. 76 Furthermore, it found
that the INS, in deferring the manner of conducting the medical exthat this procedure is a mediaminations, evidenced its understanding
77
cal matter outside of its expertise.

The court also found that other courts have consistently interpreted the Immigration Act to require medical-examination procedures. 78 It found the most significant decision to be United States ex
rel Johnson v. Shaughnessy,7 9 which held that an alien could not be
excluded for mental defect without a medical examination.80 It also
relied on United States ex rel Wulf v. Esperdy.81 In that case, when
72.

Id. at 1476. "The PHS recommendation that 'conditions related to the field of mental

disorders and subject to mental determination, be grouped together...' was adopted."

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 1701.
Id. at 1476-77.
Id. at 1477 (citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1982)).
Id.

77.
78.

Id. at 1478.
Id.

79. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Johnson v. Shaughnessy, 336 U.S. 806 (1949)).
80. The court was construing section 16 of the 1917 Immigration Act, which is substantially identical to 8 U.S.C. § 1224 of the current Act. Specifically, the court in Shaughnessy
found that "[iln order that further safeguards might be provided, Congress authorized the
Surgeon General of the Public Health Service to prescribe additional regulations [continued by

8 U.S.C. § 1224 of the current Act] governing the procedure to be observed in the exercise of
that Service's exclusive authority over medical questions." Shaughnessy, 336 U.S. at 810 (emphasis supplied).
81.

United States ex rel. Wulf v. Esperdy, 277 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1960).
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the PHS diagnosed the alien as having tuberculosis, he sought to introduce evidence rebutting the certificate. The court held that the
82
statute required a PHS certificate to exclude the alien.
The Hill case is significant because it directly conflicts with the
Longstaff case. While both cases agree that Congress intended to exclude homosexuals, they disagree as to whether a medical certificate is
83
the sole procedure for that exclusion.
VI.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Court's Method of Reasoning

Fundamentally, the court's choice came down to making one of
two conclusions about congressional intent vis-i-vis the Immigration
Act. Either Congress intended to require the INS to obtain a PHS
certificate as a prerequisite to excluding lesbian and gay aliens or it
did not. The court found that Congress intended to exclude these
aliens, and that therefore the INS could use any procedure to facilitate that exclusion. Rather than addressing the issue of whether Congress mandated a procedure by which lesbian and gay aliens are to be
excluded, the court consistently focused on Congress' intent to exclude these aliens.
The court first analyzed Longstaf's assertion of eligibility for
naturalization because he was admitted in a procedurally regular fashion.84 It pointed out that "[n]o person may be naturalized unless he
has been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence in accordance with all applicable provisions of the Act."8 5 The
court found that "lawfully admitted" must mean compliance with
"substantive legal requirements" and not "mere procedural regularity." 8 6 The court's analysis is an exercise in tautology. The real issue

facing the court was whether the substantive law as embodied in the
Act requires a congressionally mandated procedure for homosexual
exclusion. Neglecting this issue, the court subtly set up a false opposi82. Id. at 538.
83. The two cases may be distinguishable. Hill relied on the Surgeon General's directive
in holding that the INS no longer had a basis for excluding lesbian and gay aliens. In re
Longstaff, on the other hand, relied on the illegality of Mr. Longstafrs entry at a time when
the PHS conducted medical examinations for homosexuality. See Lauter, Two U.S Circuits
Disagree On Admission of Gay Aliens, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 17, 1983, at 2, col. 1.
84. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1441.
85. Id. (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (1976)).
86. Id.
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tion betweeen "substantive legal requirements" and "mere procedural
regularity" as the basis for the rest of its analysis.
The court attempted to prove its theory by citing the deportation
provisions of the Act. These provisions subject an alien to deportation if he or she meets both tests of being in "the classes of aliens
excludable by the law" 7 and "in the United States in violation of [the
Act]. .... "88 The court found that "[i]t would be paradoxical if a
person who was ineligible to receive a visa and should have been excluded from admission became lawfully admitted simply because, by
error, he was not excluded." 89 Again, the court's analysis merely begs
the question. Does the statute require certain minimum procedural
requirements for exclusion or does it not? If the Act requires a PHS
certificate as a prerequisite to exclude lesbian and gay aliens, this procedure would be a substantive requirement of the Act and the alien
would have been legally admitted. Whether the Act does in fact require a PHS certificate is the question to be decided. The court's distinction between procedure and substance only obfuscated the issue.
The court, having determined that Longstaff must prove he had
been "lawfully admitted," turned to Longstall's argument that he was
not excludable at entry. The court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Boutilier to show that "Congress intended the phrase 'psychopathic personality' to include homosexuals.

. ... 90 The court's use

of Boutilier at this point deflects attention from the real issue. Longstaff did not contest the proposition that "psychopathic personality"
includes homosexuals. Congress' definition of this term as construed
in Boutilier adds nothing to the analysis. The question is whether that
exclusion must be preceded by the procedural requirement of a PHS
certificate. In this regard the court failed to give Boutilier its proper
precedential value. The Boutilier court effectively held that the PHS
has the power to create working definitions that are binding on prospective entrants. 91 In upholding the deportation order, the court
ruled that the medical reports prepared by Boutilier psychiatrists were
irrelevant to the question of psychopathic personality because it found
92
the PHS construction controling.
87. Immigration Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976).
88. Immigration Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1976).
89. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1442.
90. Id. (citing Boutiier, 387 U.S. at 120).
91. Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 122. See Boutilier Revisited, supra note 7, at 365-66.
92. A pertinent rule of statutory construction requires that courts give deference to a
contemporaneous construction placed on a statute, especially if such a construction has been in
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The court discussed in detail the procedures by which administrative officials have examined and certified entering aliens. 93 Curiously, however, it summarily passed over those points most vital to
ascertaining whether or not the administrative officials' statutory contruction supports or precludes Longstaff's argument. For instance,
the court claimed that "[p]resumably, if an applicant for a visa answered 'yes' to the psychopathic personality question, he would be
denied a visa." 94 Similarly, it also claimed that "[t]here is no evidence
in the record regarding the procedure followed when an alien who
arrived in the United States with a visa affirmatively disclosed at that
time that he was a homosexual." 95 Without any evidentiary basis, the
court made assumptions that enabled it to hold that an alien's own
admission should provide sufficient evidence for exclusion in the absence of a PHS certificate.
While the court admitted that the administrative practice has
been to require a PHS certificate, 96 it rejected the import of this fact,
alluding to the Boutilier court's finding of a "clear congressional intent to exclude persons who are homosexuals at the time they seek
entry."'97 Furthermore, the court found that even absent Boutilier,
"Congress declared its intention unmistakably by amending the statute to bar 'sexual deviates.' "9 The court confused the issue as one of
substance versus procedure. Congressional intent to exclude is not the
crucial issue. The court's use of congressional intent at the point
where it should be analyzing the importance of past administrative
procedural practice serves only to mask the importance of that practice. The past INS practice is crucial. Prior to the Surgeon General's
policy change whereby lesbian and gay aliens were no longer certified,
the INS routinely relied on tPHS certification for all medically-based
exclusions. 99
accordance with judicial decisions acquiesced in Norwegian Nitrogen v. U.S., 288 U.S. 294

(1933). For a discussion of judicial interpretation of medical-procedure requirements in the
Immigration and Nationality Act, see Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d at 1478. "The courts have consist-

ently interpreted the Act as setting up procedures for medical examination and certification
that must be complied with."
93. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1445-47.
94. Id. at 1445.
95. Id. at 1446.
96. Id. "Apparently the administrative practice has been to exclude for homosexuality
only those persons for whom a certificate was issued."
97. Id. at 1447.
98. Id.
99. See Hill, 714 F.2d at 1477. "Since the adoption of the 1952 Act and continuing
consistently up until the INS' recent change of heart, it has required a medical examination

176.
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The court assumed that it "need not search committee reports or
read legislative debates to learn the congressional mandate."' ' The
court need not search for Congress' intent to exclude lesbians and
gays, but it should ascertain whether Congress mandated a procedure
for that exclusion. Both the House and the Senate published reports
accompanying the passage of the Immigration Act. 101 The Senate report standing alone appears to support a total exclusion of lesbian and
gay aliens. It stated that although the PHS term "psychopathic personality" was "sufficiently broad" to include these aliens, "[t]his
change in nomenclature is not to be construed in any way as modifying the intent to exclude all aliens who are sexual deviates."' 0 2 The
House Report, however, specifically adopted the definition of psychopathic personality supplied by the PHS. 0 3 The PHS relied on contemporary medical definitions for its own definition.1° 4 The PHS
report stated that the label 'frequently.

.

.include[s] those groups of

individuals suffering from . . .sexual deviation."' 0 5 The legislative
history, though lacking unequivocal support for or against total exclusion, lends strong support to a medical interpretation of the section
under consideration.
The Immigration Act as a whole clearly separates medical from
nonmedical criteria for alien exclusion. The 1952 Act lists certain
classes of aliens that shall be excluded from admission to the United
States.1 06 The first seven classes of excludable aliens describe physical
and mental conditions. 0 7 The pertinent subsection in this case ex-

and certificate for exclusion on medical grounds." See also In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1446.
"Apparently the administrative practice has been to exclude for homosexuality only those persons for whom a certificate was issued."
100. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1447.
101. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 45-56 (1952), reprintedin 1952 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1699 (hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1365]; S.REP. No. 1137,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1952) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1137].
102. S.REP. No. 1137, supra note 101, at 9.
103. H.R. REP. No. 1365, supra note 101, at 46-48.
104. Id.
105. Public Health Service, Report on the Medical Aspects of H.R. 2379, in H.R. REP.
No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4647 (1952), reprintedin 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1653, 1700.
106. Immigration Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1976).
107. Id. "(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the following classes of aliens
shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United States:
(1) Aliens who are mentally retarded; (2) Aliens who are insane; (3) Aliens who have had one
or more attacks of insanity; (4) Aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality, or sexual deviation, or a mental defect; (5) Aliens who are narcotic drug addicts or chronic alcoholics; (6)
Aliens who are afflicted with any dangerous contagious disease; (7) Aliens not comprehended
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cludes "[a]liens afflicted with psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or a
mental defect."' 0 8 Congress neither defined those terms in the Act,
nor did it specifically segregate the physical and mental conditions
from the other excludable criteria. Nevertheless, other portions of the
Act imply a clear congressional intent to treat the physical and
mental conditions as medical conditions deserving different procedures for exclusion than nonmedical criteria. For example, section
234 requires that "[t]he physical and mental examination of arriving
aliens. . . shall be made by medical officers of the United States Public Health Service, who shall conduct all medical examinations and
shall certify... any physical and mental defect or disease observed
by such medical officers in any such alien." 1°9 The section further
specifies that PHS medical officers with special training in the diagnosis of insanity and mental defects "shall be provided with suitable facitilies for the detention and examination of all arriving aliens who it is
suspected may be excludable under paragraphs (1), (2), (3), or (5) of
section 212(a)." 0 Finally, this section provides that any certified
alien under paragraphs (1) through (5) "may appeal to a board of
medical officers of the United States Public Health Service.""' The
next two sections also imply a distinction between medical and nonmedical criteria for alien exclusion. In section 235, Congress provided that "[t]he inspection, other than the physical and mental
examination, of aliens . . . shall be conducted by immigration officers." 1 2 Finally, section 236 provides that if an alien is certified
undeL- these medical exclusions, "the decision of the special inquiry
' 3
officer shall be based solely upon such certification." "
The Justice Department has also specifically recognized the distinction between medical and nonmedical criteria for alien exclusion.
The departmental regulations affecting the INS refer to "medical
grounds for eligibility" and cite to section 212(a)(1) through (6) of the
within any of the foregoing classes who are certified by the examining surgeon as having a
physical defect, disease, or disability, when determined by the consular or immigration officer
to be of such a nature that it may effect the ability of the alien to earn a living, unless the alien
affirmatively establishes that he will not have to earn a living." Id.
108. Immigration Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1976). Congress amended the subsection in
1965. "Sexual deviation" now replaces "epilepsy." See supra note 12.
109. Immigration Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1224 (1976).

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Immigration Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
113. Immigration Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d) (1976).
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Immigration Act. 114 Seen in this light, Congress intended the physical and mental exclusions to be considered as a separate, medical
category.
When the court did finally address the central question of
whether a PHS certificate is required, it again reduced the analysis to
mere tautology: "If only certification of homosexuality by a medical
officer could warrant exclusion of homosexuals, then the Surgeon
' 5
General would have effectively checkmated Congressional policy."
Congressional policy should be that which the court seeks to discover.
The court's unstated premise was that the PHS should be without
power to influence congressional policy in this area. Its assumption of
this premise, however, ignored the role played by the PHS.
If the court had looked at the evidence, it would have concluded
that the PHS had the power to change the congressional policy. The
administrative and judicial decisions have consistently required a PHS
certificate to exclude these aliens. " 6 Furthermore, Congress has consistently relied on PHS formulations in developing its immigration
policy. 117 The PHS, with the concurrence of the courts and the INS,
classified lesbian and gay aliens as psychopathic inferiors and/or
mental defectives, making them ineligible for admission under the
1917 Immigration Act."" When Congress sought to revise the immigration laws in the late forties, it sought PHS advice and formulations
in an effort to modernize the medical portions of the Immigration
Act."19

The PHS has regularly devised its own definitions in the Immigration Act for terms which it has the responsibility to enforce. 120
Apparently these definitions have never been reviewed by the courts,
the INS, or Congress. 12 1 For instance, the Immigration Act's exclusion of aliens afflicted with epilepsy has been interpreted by the PHS
to apply only to those aliens with idiopathic epilepsy. Idiopathic epi-

lepsy encompasses only convulsive disorders of unknown origin, not
those traceable to known causes. 122 Similarly, the PHS must certify
114. 22 C.F.R. § 42.91(1-6) (1985). The regulations explicitly bind a consular officer to
the PHS determination.
115. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1447.
116. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
118. See Boutilier Revisited, supra note 7, at 361-62.
119. Id. at 362-63.
120. Id. at 384.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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those aliens with a dangerous contagious disease. Originally, the PHS
included nineteen diseases. In 1961 the list grew to twenty-one. In
1970, that list was reduced to fourteen ailments. 123
Under the circumstances, the court should not have focused on
whom Congress intended to exclude when it enacted the statute. The
central question should have been whether Congress mandated a procedure to exclude lesbian and gay aliens, and whether the PHS had
the authority to reshape congressionally-mandated definitions.
B.

The Court's Application of Statutory ConstructionRules

The court found that, although a medical certificate is conclusive
evidence that an alien is to be excluded, "neither the premise nor the
inference leads to the conclusion that non-excludability is conclusively established by the absence of any examination at all." 124 The
court assumed that the procedural protections built into the statute
merely demonstrate a congressional intent that only competent evidence of medical excludability would be admissable.1 25
The court's assumptions were not based on rules of statutory
construction. One such rule requires that every word, sentence and
provision should be given effect because it was intended for some useful purpose.1 26 Section 1226(d) of the Act provides in pertinent part
that "[i]f a medical officer . . . has certified . . . that an alien is afflicted. . . with any mental disease, defect, or disability which would
bring such alien within any of the classes excluded . . . [under the

medical exclusions] of this title, the decision of the special inquiry
officer shall be based solely upon such certification." 1 27 It is the certificate that brings an alien within one of the medical classes that may be
excluded, and PHS certification is the sole evidence admissible at a
hearing. Although the clause is susceptible to the court's interpretation, when taken together with the section 1224 certification requirement, Congress' intention becomes clearer.1 28 Congress requires PHS
123. Id. at 384-85.
124. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1448.
125. Id.
126. See, eg., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 139 F.2d 298, 307 (9th Cir.),
aff'd, 324 U.S. 890 (1943).
127. Immigration Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d) (1976) (emphasis added).
128. Immigration Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1224 (1976). "The physical and mental examination of
arriving aliens... shall be made by medical officers of the United States Public Health Service, who shall conduct all medical examinations and shall certify . . . any physical and
mental defect or disease observed by such medical officers in any such alien."
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certification as the sole exclusion procedure. 129
Another rule of construction states that where no exceptions are
made to the general language of the statute, it will be presumed that
no exceptions were intended. 130 The rule of expresso unius est exclusio
alterius states that where the statute specifies performance of certain
things by specified means or a particular manner, it implies that the
performance shall not be done in another manner.131 These prescriptions fly in the face of the court's presumption that the absence of a
PHS certificate did not prevent exclusion of lesbian and gay aliens.' 32
In holding that Congress intended to allow any competent evidence of medical excludability, the court acknowledged that in Boutilier and other cases the courts relied solely on the medical certificates.
Nevertheless, the court felt that these decisions "do not establish that
the certificate is indispensable."1 33 Rules of statutory construction require great deference to these judicial decisions. 34
In response to the policy change whereby the PHS stopped certifying lesbian and gay aliens, the INS changed its policy to exclude
these aliens if they or a third person voluntarily state that an alien
arriving in the United States is a homosexual. A signed statement
avowing homosexuality forms the evidentiary basis for exclusion. According to the court, "the administrative agency charged with enforcement of the Act has interpreted it as not requiring a medical
certificate as a condition for the exclusion of homosexuals. This interpretation is entitled to deference. 1' 35 The court misapplied the pertinent rule of statutory construction. Statutes are to be construed in
light of circumstances existing at the time of the statute's enactment,
not in light of subsequent developments. 136 More specifically, rules of
129.

Section 1224 in pertinent part states that PHS physicians "shall conduct all medical

examinations and shall certify . . . any physical and mental defect." Immigration Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1224 (1976).
130. See, e.g., Lynch v. Alworth-Stevens Co., 294 F. 190, 194 (8th Cir.), affid, 267 U.S.
364 (1923).
131. Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Comm'r, 139 F.2d 863, 864 (8th Cir. 1944) (citing Botany
Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282 (1928)); Raleigh & Gaston R. Co. v. Reid, 80
U.S. 269, 270 (1872); Martin v. Comm'r, 61 F.2d 942, 944 (2d Cir. 1932); Jones v. H.D. & J.K.
Crosswell, Inc., 60 F.2d 827, 828 (4th Cir. 1932). See also Continental Casualty Co. v. United
States, 314 U.S. 527 (1942) (holding that an affirmative description of powers granted implies a
denial of nondescribed powers).
132. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1448.
133. Id.
134. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
135. In re Longstaff, 716 F. 2d at 1450.
136. Fogarty v. U.S., 340 U.S. 8 (1950).
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statutory construction require courts to give weight to the contemporaneous construction137 of officers and departments charged with the

duty of executing the statute. 13 Furthermore, when the language of a
statute is uncertain, the construction placed on it by contemporaries
should not be overturned except for cogent reasons. This is especially

true where the statute has been in force for a substantial period of
time and the contemporaneous construction has been accepted during
that time. 139 Here, not only did the INS enforce the present statute
for almost thirty years by requiring a PHS certificate, but it enforced
the original immigration statute on which the present one was
modeled in the same manner. 140

The court concluded that because Congressional power over immigration and naturalization is plenary, only Congress can change its
policy. Ironically, the court used this basis to find that the new INS
policy was a legitimate exercise of its power. It is clear however that,

while the PHS has the power to grant or deny certification to those
aliens arguably within a medical basis for exclusion, the INS is constrained by the provisions of the Immigration Act to require PHS certification as a prerequisite to alien exclusion on medical grounds.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Exclusion of lesbian and gay aliens can no longer be considered
anything but arbitrary.' 4 ' The history, language and structure of the
137. "Contemporaneous construction" within the meaning of the rule is the construction
that executive officers and departments give a statute at or near the time of its enactment. 82
C.J.S. Statutes § 359 (1953). The "contemporaneous construction" doctrine has long been
specifically applied to immigration and naturalization. See, eg., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1949).
138. Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315 (1938) (citing
Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 96 (1934)). For a discussion on administrative practice
in this area, see In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1445 & n. 43. See also Hill, 714 F.2d at 1477-78;
Boutilier Revisited, supra note 2, at 379.
139. Dismuke v. U.S., 297 U.S. 167, 174 (1935). See also Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co.
v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933).
140. See In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1444 & n. 28.
141. One commentator has argued that in a case such as this one, the results can only be
attributable to what he calls "judicial homophobia." J. Dressier, JudicialHomophobia: Gay
Rights Biggest Roadblock, 5 Civ. Lm. REv.19 (1979). This same commentator points out that
"[lit
is the goal of the American judiciary to be, as Felix Frankfurter put it, 'as free, impartial,
and independent as the lot of humanity will admit.' Such a goal is especially important when
civil liberties or rights are at stake." Id. at 20. Here nothing less is at stake than one's ability
to become a citizen of this nation. This court relegates to a footnote what is likely the essential
basis for its holding: "[lit is evident that moral as well as medical reasons underlay the congressional decision to exclude homosexuals." In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1450. In making
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Act clearly point to a medical basis for excluding lesbian and gay
aliens. That basis is no longer tenable in light of the changing medical
opinions toward homosexuality that culminated in the Surgeon General's change of policy regarding lesbian and gay immigration. Congress delegated to the Surgeon General the procedural basis for
medical exclusions. Congress is free to change the procedures for excluding lesbian and gay aliens. It is imperative that the judiciary
adopt sound judgment and clear headed reasoning over ignorance and
prejudice.
Mickey Wheatley
this pronouncement the court neglects to offer any evidence to substantiate its rationalization.
Perhaps it is the court that finds a moral rationale for excluding these aliens. The court should
not substitute its own morality for that of Congress. Even if Congress did have moral reservations about lesbian and gay aliens, it realized that any exclusions must be achieved under the
strictest scrutiny by medical and psychiatric professionals.

